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* This paper draws heavily on Takatoshi Ito, "Debt, Deflation, and Decling Growth: New 
Challenges of the Japanese Economy" to be published in the International Economic Association 
publication edited by M. Krasner, in 2004.  
1. Introduction  
The economic growth rate has been quite low during the 1990s.  General prices and 
wages have been declining since the late 1990s, and deflation seems to have set in. 
Although the nominal interest rate has been zero for the last few years, that has failed to 
stimulate investment and consumption. Several fiscal stimulus packages—discretionary 
public expenditures and tax cuts—have been employed, but they too failed to stimulate 
private-sector investment and consumption. Due to deficit spending and declining tax 
revenues, the government debt-GDP ratio has risen from 60% in the beginning of the 1990s 
to 140% in 2002. According to the Moody’s, the Japanese government bonds are now rated 
below the Botswana counterpart. With apparent ineffectiveness of monetary and fiscal 
policy, the Japanese economy is drifting downward. The size of the nominal GDP has 
shrunk by 5% between 1997 and 2003.  
The difficulties of the Japanese economy are quite unprecedented among 
industrialized countries in the postwar period. They pose a challenge both in economic 
theory and in policy practice. The core of the symptoms is a combination of deflation, 
accumulation of debts, banking fragility, and loss of growth. The challenges lie in four 
major policy areas: Monetary Policy, Bank Supervision, Fiscal Policy, and Exchange Rate 
Policy. They are briefly described here and analyzed in detail in later sections.  
The Japanese economy is suffering from an unusual set of circumstances—some 
of them have not been seen for a long time in world economic history. A combination of 
deflation (negative rate of changes in the general price levels, such as Consumer Price 
Index and GDP deflator) and a sustained zero interest rate is a rare situation. The Japanese 
case may be the first example of liquidity trap since the experiences in the Great 
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Depression in the 1930s. The Bank of Japan has maintained the nominal interest rate at 
zero percent since 1999 (with a brief period of raising the interest rate to 0.25% from 
August 2000 to March 2001). But, the prices have not responded to the policy. Deflation 
and the zero nominal interest rate means that the real interest rate is positive. Many 
economists have called for monetary easing, in terms expanding monetary base, even with 
the interest rate being zero, since price movements are fundamentally of monetary 
phenomenon. The Bank of Japan economists have argued that the effects of quantitative 
easing are uncertain.  To purchase the long-term government bonds was seen as one option, 
and indeed the amount of monthly purchase was raised in several steps from 1999 to 2002. 
More aggressive options for the Bank of Japan, that is to purchase real assets, such as real 
estates and equities, were proposed by economists but not implemented by the Bank of 
Japan. The Bank of Japan has contended that such unconventional monetary policy has at 
best uncertain effects and potentially very risky—it may result in damaging balance sheets 
of the Bank and also in hyper-inflation due to too much liquidity. Many economists 
thought that the aggressive options were at least worth trying with few side-effects and 
dismissed the concern over hyper-inflation as a remote possibility because of known 
weapons to battle it before it becomes reality. But, with the zero interest rate and 
continuation of purchase of long-term bonds, what else could the central bank do, when the 
prices continue to decline even at the zero interest rate (i.e., the real interest rate remains 
high)?  
Deflation (or unexpected disinflation in general) causes a particular hardship on 
borrowers with nominal debt contracts. Asset price deflation makes those individuals and 
corporations who invested in real estates and stocks with borrowed funds particularly hard 
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hit.  
One possible adjustment mechanism for a weak, stagnant open-economy is one 
through currency depreciation.  Investors may want to escape from the economy with a 
banking crisis and without growth potential for other stronger economies. Capital outflows 
most likely cause the currency of the weak economy to depreciate. Depreciation helps an 
ailing economy by stimulating exports.  This is part of an automatic adjustment mechanism. 
However, a quick and large depreciation, such as one in an emerging market currency 
crisis, results in high inflation, but this does not apply to a deflationary economy like Japan 
in the beginning of the 2000s. Depreciation in fact helps curing deflation in Japan. 
Theoretically speaking, the argument is right. However, depreciation is not happening to  
Japan.  The yen repeatedly appreciated to the level that choked off exports (or at least 
squeezed profits in the export sector). Should the monetary authority actively seek yen 
depreciation, given that private-sector adjustment is not there and other traditional policy 
has either failed or become ineffective? 
 
2. The Lost Decade  
Let us review a rise and fall of the Japanese economy in key indicators. The 
average growth rate of Japanese real GDP from 1981 to 1992 was 4.4%, while that from 
1993 to 2002 was 1.1%. The drop in the growth rate by 3% from the 1980s to the 1990s is 
substantial. The magic of the Japanese economy and the fame of the Japanese management 
completely faded away. The 1990s is now known as a lost decade in Japan, and the above 
statistics illustrate the point.  
A debate over the causes of this significant change in growth trend has emerged. 
One camp, probably labeled as a real business cycle camp, emphasizes a slowdown in 
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technological progress (lower total factor productivity growth) and preference of workers 
for more leisure. In fact, the labor input has declined as much as output, so the output per 
labor has not declined, or even increased slightly over the decade. The unemployment has 
increased steadily. Hayashi and Prescott (2002) cited the change in the total factor 
productivity growth and increased national holidays as possible explanations for the 
slowdown of Japanese economic growth.  Others cite the losing competitiveness of 
Japanese exports and the hollowing out of the Japanese industrial base. Japanese 
corporations are investing increasingly in China and other Asian countries. Many Japanese 
multinationals, such as Sony and Toyota, are truly global in the sense production and 
earnings are evenly divided among Japan, the North America and EU. Consumers are also 
to blame for the stagnant economy. They are too risk-averse in consuming because they are 
wary of the prospects of pensions.  
On the supply side, the real-business-cycle explanation of the Japanese lost 
decade has the same difficulty with the real-business-cycle explanation of the Great 
Depression. The decline in output is basically explained by a sudden mass-preference for 
leisure, and the fact that unemployment is increasing is ignored. Another problem with the 
supply side explanation is disinflation and deflation. If aggregate supply has declined 
without affecting aggregate demand, the prices should rise due to excess demand.  
Aggregate demand must have decreased faster than aggregate supply, because the inflation 
rate has become lower and lower, and eventually became negative.  
Figure 1 shows the inflation rate, measured by the consumer price index (CPI) 
excluding fresh food and being adjusted for the introduction of the consumption tax in 
1989 and the increase of the consumption tax rate in 1997. The CPI inflation rate shows a 
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cyclical movement, reflecting ups and downs of real economy. The sustained strong 
economic growth toward the end of the 1980s resulted in 3% inflation in 1990, and a 
temporal recovery in 1996 produced positive inflation rate in 1997. However, there is a 
clear downward trend of the inflation rate from 1990 to 2002.  The inflation rate has been 
negative since 1998, but it became significantly so (minus 1%) since the fall of 2000. The 
longer the economy is in the deflationary environment, the harder the  prospect becomes of 
getting out of it.  
The CPI inflation rate rose in 2003, and became positive in October 2003, for the 
first time in the last six years. Some observers think that the Japanese economy is finally 
getting out of deflation. However, the increase in the CPI inflation rate in the summer and 
fall of 2003 is commonly attributed to the special factors, such as the hike in the cigarette 
tax and the rice price increase due to a cold summer. The GDP deflator is still showing 
deflation by more than 3%. The CPI inflation has an upward bias and the GDP deflator has 
a downward bias. Most likely, the true deflation is somewhere at the  
1%-2%. 
There is also a debate regarding the causes of disinflation and deflation. Just like 
the debate over the cause of output stagnation, there is a camp which argues that deflation 
reflects the real factors. Technological progress in IT goods drove down prices; imports 
from China have driven down prices of domestically produced goods in competition; and 
structural reforms, such as breaking down monopolies, in Japan put competitive pressure 
on prices. Many of those who think that this is the case even regard that deflation is a good 
thing, because they represent more efficiency in production.  
Those who regard deflation as a monetary phenomenon have a different view. 
 6
Lower prices of IT goods, imports of inexpensive Chinese goods, efficient allocation of 
resources and more competition all point to the change in relative prices. Those goods with 
higher productivity most likely experience the fall in prices in relation to other goods. 
However, whether overall price levels go up or down depends on how much money is 
supplied to the economy. Inflation and deflation are each a consequence of monetary 
policy in the long run. We will review this debate in details in the later sections of this 
paper.  
A combination of very slow growth of the real economy and deflation, the 
Japanese nominal GDP has been actually shrinking since 1997. The size of nominal GDP 
in 2002 was about 5% smaller than the peak in 1997. The size of the Japanese economy in 
terms of the US dollar is greatly influenced by the changes in the yen/dollar rate. Still, the 
yen/dollar rate reflects productivity and macroeconomic growth in the long run. Therefore, 
the relative size of the two countries shows the relative strength and growth of their 
economies. The size of the Japanese economy went from just above 30% of the U.S. 
economy in 1985 to more than 70% of the U.S. economy in 1995—most of which reflects 
the appreciation of the yen from 260 yen/dollar to 80 yen/dollar. And then the ratio came 
down to below 40% in 2002. The decline in the ratio in the second half of the 1990s reflects 
slower growth in Japan and deflation.  
The rise and fall of the Japanese economy can be most visibly demonstrated by the 
rise and fall of asset prices. The stock and land prices quadrupled in the 1980s, and the 
stock prices peaked at the end of 1989, while the land prices peaked in 1991. By 2002 these 
asset prices lost all the gains made in the preceding ten years. The price levels have become 
one-fourth of the peak values in eleven to twelve years. With the benefit of hindsight, the 
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asset price inflation in the 1980s is considered to be a bubble, and the deflation in the 1990s 
is a result of its burst. The magnitude of the bubble and its burst is certainly one of the 
largest among the history of bubbles in the world. The land prices have been declining 
steadily, and the speed of decline has not slowed down.  
The magnitude of the increase and decrease in asset prices certainly put any real 
estate investors in difficult positions.  Most severely affected were the developers, real 
estate companies and construction companies. They took inventory of land with borrowed 
money, while the value of land started to fall. Either developing commercial properties or 
selling land outright would have made them instantly insolvent.  Instead, they stopped 
interest payment to banks. Banks that regarded going-concern values of corporations much 
higher than liquidation values kept lending to these nonperforming corporations, hoping 
that one day, land prices would turn up and development would take place. The hope has 
never turned into a reality, and many of these corporations did go bankrupt, or banks were 
forced to write down or forgive these nonperforming loans.  
Those who hold debts—almost all of them are nominally fixed amount of 
debts—suffer from general price declines and asset price declines, as the real burden of 
debts become large. Those who borrowed to build owner-occupied housing at around the 
peak of the bubble suffer from negative wealth effect (more savings to make up losses) and 
negative equity (additional payments are needed to get out of current housing, a severe 
constraint for moving to new housing).  Consumption was depressed.    
So, asset price deflation adversely affected output activities through many 
channels, including nonperforming loans, capital shortage of banks, negative wealth 
effects, and negative equity of mortgaged home owners. In short, asset price deflation 
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caused negative demand shocks. But, negative demand shocks depressed consumer prices 
and asset prices. Thus, a deflationary spiral occurred.  
Combining all these observations, one may conclude that Japan in the 1990s 
suffered from debt deflation, a mechanism that is sometimes used to explain what 
happened in the Great Depression of the 1930s. (See Fisher (1933) for a seminal work, and 
King (1993) for more modern application.) The experience of Japan in the 1990s may not 
be as acute as the Great Depression, maybe because Japan in the 1990s had more safety net 
than the US in the 1930s, but the cumulative damage of the prolonged recession in Japan 
may rival the damage done by the Great Depression.  
In the next two subsections, chronological explanation of the bubble and its burst 
will be given. The description of what went wrong will be useful in discussing various 
policy options and application of economic theories in solving the current difficulties in 
later sections. In some of the critical points in history, there is no consensus even among 
the economists. This shows the magnitude and complexity of the debt deflation in Japan. 
3. The zero bound nominal interest rate and quantitative easing  
When the nominal policy interest rate was brought down to zero, it was difficult to 
imagine a channel through which conventional monetary policy could continue to work. 
The nominal interest rate cannot be negative, and providing more monetary base by buying 
more treasury bills (open market operations) does not seem to have a channel to be 
effective in stimulating either consumption or investment. What else could the central bank 
do other than keeping the short-term interest rate at zero? When the prices continue to 
decline even at the zero interest rate, the real interest rate will rise and there seems to be 
nothing conventional monetary policy can do to stop it.  
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The zero bound interest rate has generated a sudden burst of interest in the 
literature. See Svensson (2001) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Jung, Teranishi, and 
Watanabe (2003) to name a few.  
Beyond the zero interest rate policy, the central bank can expand monetary base 
by purchasing long bonds and other kinds of assets as well as short-term (treasury) bills. 
One perspective is that it is important to expand monetary base, regardless of what assets 
the Bank of Japan buys, because increased monetary base has to find way to other kinds of 
assets. However, many have pointed out, and it is observed in Japan, that expanded 
monetary base through an increased open market operations does not necessarily result in a 
boom in other kinds of assets or bank lending. Since cash and short-term bills become 
perfect substitute, there will be excess reserves at the central bank. It matters what kind of 
assets that the Bank of Japan purchase against its injection of monetary base. So, it has to 
be examined whether effectiveness of monetary expansion is different for different assets 
that the central bank will purchase.  
Another issue to examine is whether the Bank of Japan can credibly promise easy 
money not just for now but for future. By providing enough liquidity, the central bank may 
create expectation that the interest rate may be kept low in the future. The expectation of 
deflation to end soon may be generated by extraordinary liquidity. However, if this is the 
channel to use, the central bank should also announce the inflation target in the future to 
make the commitment more explicitly and credibly. (See below the section on inflation 
targeting.)  
Those who believe in the power of monetary policy even at the zero interest rate 
have pointed out beneficial effects of quantitative easing through several different channels. 
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First, more monetary base must find ways to be invested in stocks, foreign bonds and 
domestic bonds, if not lent to corporations. Portfolio shift must occur to riskier assets. If 
money is directed to the stock market, the stock prices will rise and this is good for banks 
who hold equities on their balance sheets and the overall economy. If money finds its way 
to foreign bonds, the yen would be depreciated and exporting sectors earn more profits.  If 
liquidity flows into long bonds, then the long bond interest rate will be lowered and that is 
good for investment. Although it is not clear beforehand which channel will work, there is 
nothing to lose by trying it.  
Second, another possible channel of quantitative easing to stimulate the economy 
is through inflation expectation. By providing enough quantity, consumers and investors 
may be convinced of the coming certainty of getting out of deflation. This expectation 
channel is important for lowering the real interest rate.  
Therefore, important debating points on the actions of the central bank under 
deflation are as follows: (1) which assets the central bank should purchase; (2) how to 
signal commitments of the central bank to the future policy. However, before examining 
these issues, it is important to review costs of deflation, since several commentators (and 
even economists) in Japan sometimes have expressed a view that there is nothing wrong 
with deflation. Some even think that deflation is beneficial. 
 
4. Adverse Effects of Deflation  
Deflation is quite damaging to the economy. The costs of hyper-inflation have 
been a concern of central banks and economists around the world in the last half century. 
Great efforts by central banks have successfully lowered the inflation rate around world to 
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the single digit in most of the industrial countries by the late 1990s. However, costs of 
deflation had not been appreciated until they became apparent in Japan. Now many think 
that deflation may be more damaging than inflation.  
The first problem is not due to deflation per se, but a problem with unexpected 
disinflation. An unintended income transfer is a result of unexpected disinflation, that is, 
the lowering of the inflation rate. When deflation occurs unexpectedly, it is a special, 
extreme case of unexpected disinflation. Suppose that a five -year loan contract was made 
in 1997 in Japan, a borrower and a lender would not have expected that the price level of 
2002 would be lower than that of 1997. The 5-year interest rate (bank debenture) in 1997 
was at around 1.6%. The inflation rate at the time was close to 0.5% (if the effect of 
consumption tax increase was adjusted). Therefore with a static expectation, the real 
interest rate was about 1.1%, and the real value of the loan for the borrower five years later 
would have been about 2% lower. This was expectation. However, the reality was that the 
inflation rate in the following five years was negative, making the real burden of about 2% 
higher instead. In this sense, with a contract of 100 million yen, there was an ex post 
transfer of 4 million yen from borrowers to lenders. Although unexpected disinflation is 
supposed to produce windfall gains to lenders, even lenders may suffer if borrowers go 
bankrupt due to increased burden of liability.  
Under deflation when the interest rate is already zero, even expected deflation has 
an adverse effect. Deflation with the nominal interest rate being zero will make monetary 
policy ineffective.  This situation can be viewed as a famous liquidity trap. Costs of 
deflation when the interest rate is zero can be understood in the following four categories.   
First, the zero bound interest rate means that the central bank loses a grip on the 
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real interest rate (equal to the nominal interest rate minus the inflation rate), because the 
real interest rate becomes the absolute value of deflation rate, as the nominal interest rate 
equals zero. As deflation becomes worse, the real interest rate goes up.  The high real 
interest rate will dampen consumption and investment.  Consumption will be depressed as 
reward for waiting for a later timing for purchasing consumer durables becomes higher. In 
other words, prices are dropping (and the real interest rate is high) and consumers will 
postpone the timing of purchase. Investment will be depressed as the cost of capital will be 
higher.  
Second, deflation of the general price levels will likely cause, or worsen, asset 
price deflation. The discounted sum of the future returns to fixed investment, land, or 
equities of companies, will fall as deflation becomes worse and the real interest rate 
becomes higher. Then, land prices and stock prices will fall. General deflation will cause, 
through a standard asset pricing method, asset price deflation. This in turn will cause 
financial fragility, as many companies and banks hold equities and use land as collateral.    
Third, the difficulty of not having a monetary policy tool under deflation with the 
zero interest rate policy will be increased if downward wage adjustment is difficult. Some 
economists think that costs of low inflation starts at around 2% inflation rate, as the 
downward rigidity of wages will make it difficult to make smooth reallocation of labor 
force. (See Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) for a detailed study on this point.) In Japan, 
bonus payments for almost all regular full time workers have a large share of annual 
earnings. Bonus payments are known to be much more flexible than the monthly wage. 
(See Ito (1992) some econometric evidence for earlier periods.  See also Kuroda and 
Yamamoto (2003a, 2003b) for a more recent study on the adjustment of the hourly wage 
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part, but not bonuses. When Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003c) asks the question on the 
impact of nominal rigidity on unemployment rate in a simulation model, the bonus 
adjustment is taken into account with a large impact lowering hike of the unemployment 
rate.) Although this is less of a problem in Japan where labor income flexibility including 
bonus payments is higher than Europe and the United States, deflation certainly makes it 
harder to adjust real wages.  
Fourth, a deflationary spiral makes it more difficult to get out of deflation. 
Deflation in general prices (CPI) causes weaker output activities and declines in asset 
prices. Declines in asset prices further depress output activities. In turn, recession will 
depress general prices, namely deflation. As this logic is understood, consumers and 
corporations will develop deflationary expectations, making a forward-looking real 
interest rate higher. It would be difficult to make corrections on a higher forward-looking 
real interest rate, once it is set in the mind of consumers and corporations. The commitment 
by a credible central bank about the future monetary policy path is the only way to have 
some influences on the deflationary expectation. 
5. Unconventional Monetary Policy  
(5.1) Actions by the Bank of Japan  
In March 2001, the Bank of Japan decided to change the policy instrument from 
the short-term interest rate (uncollaterilized call rate) to the reserves (current account) that 
commercial banks hold at the Bank of Japan. From March 2001 to date (summer of 2003), 
three instruments were used to indicate the stance of monetary policy, or the degree of 
quantitative easing: excess reserves (the balance of current account at the Bank of Japan), 
the amount of monthly purchase of long bonds from the market by the Bank of Japan, and 
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the change in the official discount rate. In addition, the Lombard-type lending facility was 
introduced.  The Bank of Japan increased the degree of quantitative easing in steps as 
shown in Table 1.  
The amount of monthly purchases of long bonds expanded from 400 billion at the 
time of financial crisis. It was raised to 600 billion in August 2001, to 800 billion in 
December, 1 trillion yen in February 28, and 1.2 trillion yen in October 30. This shows that 
the Bank of Japan has been willing to expand money supply by substituting short and long 
bonds. In a sense, monetization of long bonds has been implemented.  
The Bank of Japan also introduced the purchase of equities that are held by 
financial institutions, but this is a part of a policy to stabilize the financial system rather 
than monetary policy.  The Bank held a Policy Board meeting separate from the Monetary 
Policy Board meeting to decide this action in September 2002. Equities held by 
commercial banks had become a source of volatility in financial stability, as the 
mark-to-market evaluation became negative and deducted from tier one capital. The Bank 
of Japan decided to purchase at market price equities from commercial banks in order to 
determine the loss (or profits), so that risk of the further losses would be prevented. The 
size of the purchase was set to 2 trillion yen at the time, and then increased to 3 trillion yen 
later.  
The Bank of Japan has expanded assets to buy to asset back securities (ABS). In 
April 2003, the Bank announced that they would study ways to expand instruments for 
purchase to include ABS. In June 2003, they issued statements on how to select the types of 
ABS to purchase, without distorting market pricing.  In a sense, this is an unusual step for 
the central bank. The credit risk is high and the market may be small. The purpose seems to 
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encourage banks to lend to small- and medium-sized firms and then securitize the loan. The 
lowest grade that the Bank would purchase would be BB (double B) for ABS and A-1 
(single A one) for CPs (commercial papers). Purchase of these ABS will be made upon 
request from banks.  
These actions—an increase in long-term bond purchase, purchase of ABS, 
purchase of equities from commercial banks—are considered to be unconventional policy, 
that the Bank of Japan has done in the deflation economy.  
(5.2) Advocates  
Those who fear the costs of deflation, as elaborated in the preceding subsection, 
have advocated various unconventional monetary policies in order to bring the economy 
out of deflation quickly. The steps taken by the Bank of Japan were too little too late. 
Proposed unconventional monetary policy includes the purchase of real assets including 
equities, real estates, and asset-backed securities as well as long bonds and foreign bonds, 
by the Bank of Japan. Purchasing individual stocks may pose a political and market 
difficulty in which particular stocks to pick, but purchasing a market-based index fund 
avoids the difficulty. The listed funds of market-based funds may be more appropriate for 
transparency and liquidity. In the case of real estates, it is also difficult to purchase 
individual real estate plots, but Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), again listed in the 
stock exchange, are good investment instruments. (See Ito (1999), Meltzer (2001), 
Svensson (2001), Bernanke (2002), to name a few.)  
Purchasing long bonds is closest among unconventional monetary policy to the 
conventional monetary policy tools, and that is what the Bank of Japan has already 
practiced. Prior to March 2001, The Bank of Japan had been purchasing long-term (mainly 
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10 year) Japanese government bonds (JGBs) by 400 billion yen per month for the 
long-term provision of monetary base. The limit was raised to 600 billion yen per month in 
August 2001, in several steps to 1.2 trillion yen in October 2002. Advocates of stronger 
actions wanted to increase the size of purchase.  
A direct benefit of purchasing long bonds is to lower the long-term interest rates. 
The purchase of long bonds will flatten the yield curve, stimulating investment. Second, 
another channel, but diametrically opposite in an apparent implication, is that to lower long 
term rate implies the longer duration of the zero interest rate policy. Since the long term 
interest rate is the compounding of the expected future interest rate, the lowering of the 
long-term interest rate, either by purchasing the long bonds or others, must be based on 
changing the expectation of the future path of the short-term interest rates.  
The possible reconciliation of the second and third channel is based on the 
following scenario: if the Bank of Japan succeeds in creating an expectation that the 
short-term interest rate will be maintained at zero, even when the current inflation rate 
becomes positive, tolerating the negative interest rate. If this commitment is credibly 
transmitted to the market, inflationary expectation will not be translated into higher long 
rates. Nominal long rates remain low, while inflationary expectation becomes positive. 
Adopting inflation target is one way to transmit this kind of commitment.  
The advocates of quantitative easing cite that the economy has become more 
stimulated after the Bank of Japan raised more aggressively the target for excess reserves 
and the amount of long bond purchases. The yen depreciated from the high of 100 
yen/dollar at the early 2000 to 130 yen/dollar at the end of 2001, and the long-term interest 
rate came down to below 1 percent toward the end of 2002. All these are at least partially 
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results of quantitative easing.  
Buying foreign bonds outright by the central bank amounts to unsterilized 
intervention in the foreign exchange market. Can unsterilized intervention under the zero 
interest rate be effective in depreciating currency or in stimulating the economy in general? 
This is a question not previously considered in the literature. According to the traditional 
monetarist model, where unsterilized intervention works, but not sterilized intervention, 
the effectiveness comes from changing the interest rate differential. Then, even 
unsterilized intervention would become ineffective because the interest rate would not 
change.  
There, however, is a different camp. The relative quantity of monetary base would 
explain the exchange rate changes. According to this view, an increase in monetary base 
should be allocated to different assets, not necessarily bonds where the interest rate matters, 
and some of them to foreign assets, so that unsterilized intervention even at the zero 
interest rate would work in depreciating the currency.  
Monetary policy activists think not only that the Bank of Japan actions were too 
little too late, but many more actions are warranted under the continued deflationary and 
stagnant environment. Outright purchases of listed stock index funds as monetary policy is 
one candidate. Those who sell stocks to the Bank of Japan are risk-taking investors, unlike 
investors who sell long bonds to the Bank of Japan. Risk money would circulate to other 
stocks, foreign bonds, or real estates. If funds stayed in the stock market, that would be 
good for the stock market, but driving up the stock price is not the direct purpose of stock 
purchases. Foreign bonds may become favorite for the investors who receive new cash for 
selling stocks. That channel would depreciate the yen, so that it would stimulate the export 
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sector. If risk money moves toward real estate money, then real estate deflation may stop.  
Desired portfolio shifts among private-sector investors will be achieved more by the 
central bank purchase of risky assets. This is justified when the interest rate is zero.  
As mentioned above, the Bank of Japan indeed purchased stocks, but this was 
regarded as a policy to maintain stability in the financial system by removing a source of 
volatility from the commercial banks’ balance sheet. There is little reason that the Bank of 
Japan should refrain from purchasing a market-based portfolio of stocks from the market, 
while purchasing individual stocks from commercial banks outside the market. The former 
is more transparent, and good for the economy in general rather than individual banks.  
Another possible asset category that the Bank of Japan can purchase is foreign 
bonds. In fact, this amounts to unsterilized intervention, assuming that there is no counter 
transactions in domestic securities by the Bank, and whether this is effective or not depends 
on how one views the channel of effectiveness from intervention to the exchange rate.  
The real estate is difficult type of assets that the central bank can purchase, 
because appropriate pricing of individual real estate properties is difficult. However, listed 
real estate investment trust (REIT) is a class of assets that can be transacted with fair 
pricing. The Bank of Japan can purchase this asset in order to provide the risk money to the 
market.  The channel of forcing portfolio shifts among risk-money investors is the same as 
the case of purchasing the equities in the market.      
These additional steps would have been beneficial to the Japanese economy that 
was trapped in deflation with the zero interest rate. In addition to all the benefits described 
in the case of long bonds purchase, real asset and foreign asset purchases by the central 
bank have probable benefits of forcing portfolio shifts on those investors who are used to 
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taking risk in the stock market and foreign exchange market.  
(5.3. Skeptics)  
Despite obvious merits of quantitative easing, there are theoretical skeptics and 
empirical skeptics.  Theoretical skeptics argue that when cash and short-term bonds 
become perfect substitute (i.e., zero interest rate with excess reserves), providing more 
cash to the public does not change any behavior of consumers or corporations. Empirical 
skeptics cite the tremendous decline in the velocity of money, so that an increase in 
monetary base did not result in a comparable increase in money supply (M2). One of the 
reasons for this disjoint was the banking problem. Banks that had nonperforming loans on 
their balance sheets tend to hoard cash by keeping liquidity at the Bank of Japan as excess 
reserves or piling up government securities instead of using liquidity to lend. So long as the 
banking fragility is with Japan, pushing monetary base does not result in increasing bank 
lending.  
Those who oppose the use of unconventional monetary policy tend to use the 
following logic. First, deflation in Japan is either a good thing or a not-so-bad thing. When 
prices are dropping due to supply-side factors—innovations in high tech sectors and 
cheaper imports--, that is good for consumers and the economy at large. Real income 
would increase as income does not decrease and prices drop.  
Second, unconventional monetary policy does not work in stimulating the 
economy anyway, or has even adverse side effects.  Side effects, they argue, include 
putting the Bank of Japan balance sheet at risk of possible capital loss and increasing the 
risk of hyper-inflation. Critics argue that capital losses by the central bank would make the 
market lose confidence in the currency and therefore the yen would depreciate 
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precipitously. When liquidity is provided to such an extent through unconventional policy, 
it is like piling up dry timber, and one strike of a match would create hyperinflation without 
time to control it.  
Advocates of active monetary policy rebut the argument as follows.  As 
mentioned above, deflation has definite bad effects, regardless of its causes. Prices decline 
due to technological progress, i.e., supply side factors may be true, but that is in terms of 
relative prices. Computer prices will decline relative to other more traditional goods and 
services, but the consumer prices as the average prices of all goods and services do not 
have to decline.  The consumer prices are determined more by monetary policy than by 
prices of particular goods and services.  
Some skeptics have argued that deflation is good for consumers, as real income 
would increase if income does not decrease. This may have been true in the first year or 
two of deflation in Japan, as the inflation-slide (cost-of-living-adjustment) of pensions was 
suspended by the parliament. But, as pensions started to decrease, the pain was felt even by 
pensioners.  
It is true that the balance sheet of the central bank, if it starts to purchase equities 
and foreign bonds, would be exposed to the volatility of equity prices and the exchange rate. 
But, monetary policy activists would argue that purchases of those assets by the central 
bank do help the economy overcoming deflation, and the risk is worth taking. Moreover, 
capital losses by the central bank, if it ever happens, may be partially offset by seigniorage 
that the central bank earn from printing money, and, if it is not enough, the hole in the 
balance sheet (insolvency) may be easily filled by capital injection by the fiscal authority. 
In the consolidated balance sheet of the public sector, the central bank balance sheet can be 
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integrated into the government, and therefore concern by the Bank of Japan over such 
actions is unfounded. If the political problem of taking blame for the loss is a real reason 
for concern, the Ministry of Finance could give a promise of capital injection in the case of 
capital losses due to the price drop of assets, while achieving the inflation purpose, without 
asking the Bank executives to take responsibility.  This action would lessen the burden on 
the Bank of Japan in taking more bold actions.  
(5.4) The case in the United States  
Clouse, Henderson, Orphanides, Small, and Tinsley (2000) considered various 
policy options that the Federal Reserve could do in order to stimulate the economy, if and 
when the nominal interest rate becomes zero. The first option (keep buying treasury bills) 
may work if expectations of future paths of inflation are changed by the central bank’s 
continued purchase of treasury bills.  However, if that is the only action that the central 
bank carries out, the public may not be convinced of the power of the central bank to get 
out of deflation. The bank credit channel may not work if banks do not find it profitable to 
increase lending when the interest rate of short-term securities is already zero. Additional 
liquidity ends up in the excess reserves at the central bank.  
The second option (buying long bonds) may work by lowering the expected rate 
of future interest rate, since the long rate is the weighted sum of the future short-term rates, 
according to the expectations theory. Another possible channel is the portfolio balance 
effect, through which risk premium will be lowered, and the long bond rate will be lowered. 
Those who had long bonds will shift their portfolio and corporate bonds may be demanded.    
The third possibility is that the central bank writes options on treasury securities 
so that the central bank would lose money if the interest rate rose above the certain level. 
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This would give a strong signal that the Bank would commit to the low interest rate for 
some time.  
The fourth possibility is through intervention. The effectiveness of intervention 
has been subject to debate. Possible channels of effectiveness come from the signaling 
channel (signaling of future monetary policy change) and the portfolio shift channel 
(shifting from domestic to foreign bonds). Under the normal (positive interest rate) 
circumstances, unsterilized intervention has a stronger effect, but at zero interest rate, 
sterilized and unsterilized intervention will not be different, unless increasing the monetary 
base itself has an effect to stimulate the economy. The authors believe that it would take a 
large scale intervention to influence the exchange rate, and the duration of effectiveness 
may be fairly short. Thus, they are rather skeptical on this option.  
The fifth option is to purchase debt instruments of U.S. Financial Services 
Institutions, such as Ginnie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae. The authors first clarified 
what securities the Federal Reserve can legally purchase as a part of open market 
operations. There are interest rate spreads between the Treasury securities and those US 
FSI securities. If any purchase of these securities by the Federal Reserve changes the risk 
premium, then the purchase will have stimulating effects. The option of purchasing private 
debt is limited by law to banker’s acceptance and for rediscount. Corporate debts and 
equities are not eligible for purchase, according to the law.  
Lending to depository institutions is the sixth option. This can be done with 
various types of collaterals. Even corporate bonds or equities could be used as collateral, if 
the Federal Reserve finds it satisfactory.  Credit risk of collaterals stay with depository 
institutions. Also making loans to individuals, partnership, and corporations, for which 
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credit is not available from other banking institutions, can be possible in “unusual and 
exigent circumstances.” In a severe credit crunch situation, this option may be activated. 
Although legally this may be possible, the authors point out several drawbacks, such as 
adverse selection and political problems.  
The seventh channel is the money rains (helicopter money), that transfer wealth to 
the public from the money-printing Federal Reserve. Aside from a question on legal 
mandate, there are significant difficulties in implementing such wealth transfers. Possibly, 
the money-printing tax cut is an easiest way for implementation, this looks more like fiscal 
policy, rather than monetary policy.  
Although this paper does not particularly recommend any instruments when the 
interest rate is at zero, it sorts out options and considers both legal possibility and possible 
effectiveness from economic theory. One option conspicuously absent in this paper is 
inflation targeting.  Although the author recognizes the importance of signaling channel, 
inflation targeting is not even mentioned in the paper.  
6. Inflation Targeting  
One particular proposal to enhance credibility of the Bank of Japan to carry out its 
unconventional monetary policy is to adopt inflation targeting. See Ito (1999), Bernanke 
(2000), and Svensson (2000, 2001) to name a few. In one version, adopting inflation 
targeting means that the central bank announces the point (or a range) of inflation rate that 
the central bank will target with a specified date (or a period) in future to achieve it. 
Performance of the central bank will be assessed on the basis of how well the target was 
achieved. It the central bank cannot achieve the target and it was not due to unavoidable 
circumstances that are beyond the central bank’s control, the central bank is held 
 24
responsible.  
Inflation targeting has four kinds of benefits. First, by credibly announcing that 
the Bank of Japan adopts inflation targeting, people’s expectations of future inflation rates 
may be influenced. As argued above, the deflationary expectation (i.e., deflation will 
continue) has been taking hold. Unless expectations change, it is difficult and it takes time 
to get out of a deflationary spiral. The Bank of Japan can signal its resolve by 
announcement in order to get out of deflation in a speedier manner. Second, inflation 
targeting is a good monetary policy framework to conduct policy and communicate policy 
intention to the public.  The Bank of Japan will be held responsible for achieving the target, 
so that changes in policy will be justified relative to achieving the target. Third, the 
inflation targeting is an appropriate framework of accountability for an independent central 
bank. Many central banks, both in industrial countries and emerging market countries, 
have gained legal independence in the last fifteen years. (It was argued that independence 
was proved to be effective in lowering inflation rate, such as Alesina and Summers 
(1993).)  An independent central bank can decide the official discount rate without 
interference of the government (Ministry of Finance), and a governor’s job is guaranteed. 
In return, the central bank is asked to be accountable in their actions. Many independent 
central banks have a monetary policy board (committee) to make important decisions. 
Minutes of discussions and voting results at such a committee are disclosed. But, in order 
to be accountable, a central bank has to announce what they attempt to achieve. One of the 
best ways to be accountable is to adopt inflation targeting. This model of an independent 
central bank with a monetary policy committee and inflation targeting has been  
implemented in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Thailand, to name a few. 
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Some observers might think that accountability means a preparation for a stick—if the 
central bank fails to achieve the target, the central bank (or Governor) has to take 
responsibility. However, to adopt inflation targeting is also a protection of the central bank. 
This is the next point of argument.   
Fourth, a central bank that adopts inflation targeting also gains independence on 
policy instruments. Although the central bank becomes independent, it cannot be totally 
independent ignoring what is happening to the economy. Often the level of the inflation 
target is set by the government, as in the United Kingdom, or in consultation with the 
government. However, by agreeing to inflation targeting with accountability, the central 
bank gains instrument independence.  The government, politicians, or any other 
institutions will not be able to pressure the central bank for particular policy actions. The 
central bank would take sole responsibility to guide prices to the target. Inflation targeting 
sets the perimeter of independence.  
The general case for inflation targeting has been made, for example, by Bernanke 
and Mishkin (1997), Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999), and Svensson (2000). 
Various proposals that mention targeting a price level or an inflation rate in Japan, see 
Krugman (1998), that proposed 4% for 15 years, Ito (1999) that proposed 1 to 3% range to 
be achieved in two years, and Svensson (2001) that proposed price level targeting.  
Critics of inflation targeting have argued both on technical reasons and on more 
substantive reasons. (Critics are mostly economists at the Bank of Japan. See for example, 
Fujiki, Okina, and Shiratsuka (2001))  
For the technical front, the critics argued that it is difficult to define an appropriate 
price index (Bank of Japan (2000)) and an appropriate range, given uncertainty about the 
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bias in the price index. The critics’ arguments can be rebutted as follows: The consumer 
price index, CPI, is a standard measure for inflation. It may be better to use a core CPI, that 
excludes fresh food and first-round shocks of energy prices, but there is no such measure in 
Japan. The CPI excluding fresh food is available in Japan, and this is good enough to use. If 
the energy prices volatility messes up the inflation rate in Japan, that can be explained and 
responsibility of the Bank of Japan should be excused. This can be regarded as an escape 
clause in accountability. The upward bias in the consumer price index, constructed by the 
Laspayres index, is well-known. (See Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer Price 
Index. 1996, for the U.S. case, and Shiratsuka (1999) for the Japanese case of such a bias.) 
It is commonly estimated that the bias is somewhere between 1% and 2.5%. That is, the 
CPI inflation rate of 1% is in fact an absolute price stability. Therefore, the technical 
problem is surmountable easily. In fact, when the Bank of Japan monetary policy 
committee has changed the policy instrument in March 2001, they have adopted the CPI 
inflation rate excluding fresh food. Therefore, now even the Bank of Japan seems to have 
agreed that the CPI excluding fresh food is a good enough measure.  
On the substantive part, critics (see, for example, Fujiki, Okina and Shiratsuka) 
have argued the following. First, no credible policy instruments are available to stimulate 
the economy when the interest rate is already zero.  Second, there are side-effects of 
possibly damaging the balance sheet of the Bank of Japan. Third, by increasing liquidity so 
much, there is a danger of causing hyper-inflation in the future. They consider 
unconventional monetary policy to be uncertain in its effectiveness, while there are definite 
side-effects.  
For policy instruments, as argued above, unconventional policy advocates 
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identify equities (listed stock price index funds), REITs, and foreign bonds, when 
purchasing long bonds do not work, and the transmission channel is a portfolio shift.  
Is the Bank of Japan trying to pursue inflation targeting? One may interpret that 
Mr. Fukui, after assuming Governorship in March 2003, is sending this kind of message, 
but without committing to an inflation target framework. Governor Fukui (2003) 
emphasized the importance of tolerating inflation with zero interest rate even after 
deflation would be ended. 
7. Lessons from the Japanese Experiences  
There are several lessons learned from the Japanese experience with deflation. 
First, it is important not to fall into deflation. Avoiding deflation is easier than getting out 
of it. Second, once the economy falls into deflation, it is best to get out of it as soon as 
possible. Third, various options, that would not be employed in the usual environment 
should be considered.  
Looking at the difficulties that Japan fell in, concerns of disinflation in the United States 
were raised.  The Federal Reserve Board has issued two studies exploring options for the 
central bank when the nominal short-term interest rate becomes zero. Clouse, Henderson, 
Orphanides, Small, and Tinsley (2000) studied policy tools at the zero interest rate, based 
on historical experiences of the US in the 1930s and Japan in the 1990s. The following 
options were considered for the Federal Reserve from the economic and legal point of 
views: (1) To keep purchasing treasury bills at the zero interest rate and increase liquidity; 
(2) To purchase treasury bonds; (3) To write options on Treasury securities; (4) To 
purchase foreign bonds (intervention); (5) To purchase debt of US financial service 
institutions, such as federally-insured mortgage backed securities, and private sector; (6) 
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Lending to depository institutions and private sectors; and (7) money rain. (See details of 
these options described in section 3.3.4 above.) The paper was written at the time that the 
Bank of Japan had just adopted the zero interest rate policy and the United States inflation 
rate was coming down. It can be regarded as a preparatory work just in case. The paper was 
written on the presumption that if there are enough policy instruments at the zero interest 
rate, then the monetary authorities may not fear finding themselves at the zero interest 
rate—no precautionary positive interest rate beforehand. The results of the investigation 
are largely uncertain. Several options may be promising, but the size of their effects was 
uncertain.  
Ahearne, Gagnon, Haltmaier, and Kamin (2002) advanced research on deflation 
further. The paper directly examined the experiences of the Japanese economy. The paper 
regards that deflation is definitely something that carries adverse effects, and endorses 
early, preemptive actions to avoid it. Stimulus to avoid deflation should “go beyond the 
levels conventionally implied by baseline forecasts of future inflation and economic 
activity.” It states that the power of monetary and fiscal policy did not fall during the phase 
of disinflation, but rather during the positive interest rates, in the early 1990s. The paper 
cites an internal study and Bernanke and Gertler (1999) stating that by early action, such as 
lowering the interest rate by 200 basis points any time between 1991 and early 1995, 
deflation could have been avoided. However, it avoids direct criticism of past policy for 
not responding early enough, since deflation in Japan was unexpected by Japanese 
politicians as well as by the market.  
Bernanke (2002, 2003) emphasized that the United States should make sure that it 
does not fall into deflation in the first place. He recommends employing even 
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unconventional monetary policy to prevent the economy from falling into deflation. 
8. Is Yen Depreciation an answer to the problem?  
In Japan, current account surpluses continue to mount, and the currency tends to 
appreciate, if anything. Japanese investors may have unusually strong home 
bias—preference for domestic yen-denominated securities with very low interest rate. If 
they had preferred foreign assets with positive interest rates to zero-interest deposits and 
securities, the exchange rate would have depreciated, and that would have stimulated 
certain sectors of the economy. Some economists think that active policy causing yen 
depreciation is an answer to the difficult situation in Japan, given that the automatic 
adjustment is not happening.  Svensson (2001) proposed that unlimited intervention can be 
applied so that the yen depreciates to a pre-specified level, say 160 yen/dollar, and thereby 
stimulating the economy. Depreciation is beneficial to the economy, both by stimulating 
the export sector and causing imported inflation.  
However, it is not clear how much intervention it would take to depreciate the yen. 
If an amount becomes too large, it may affect the global financial markets, as US treasury 
bills and European treasury bills had to be purchased. 
9. Concluding Thoughts  
This paper reviewed the experiences of the Japanese economy as it fell into 
deflation. Even at the zero interest rate, the economy does not show signs of getting out of 
deflation. Indeed, zero percent is the lower bound for nominal interest rate. Debates on 
other possible monetary policy options have been reviewed in this paper.  A process of debt 
deflation seems to have been in progress. Deflation affects consumption and investment 
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adversely, and the recession causes further deflation.  As borrowers suffer from the 
increased real cost of debt, the asset prices are also affected by deflation. Once the 
economy is in deflation, the power of monetary policy is limited.  
There are several lessons from the saga of the Japanese economy. First, deflation 
is dangerous, and it is better to avoid it before the economy falls into it. The policy should 
be unusually loosening when disinflation continues or there is a possibility that deflation 
may occur. Once the economy falls into it, it is important to apply all the policies, including 
unconventional ones to get out of it as early as possible. Once deflationary expectation sets 
in, it becomes doubly difficult to get out of deflation, since there is no conventional 
monetary policy that could lower the real interest rate. Third, the power of inflation 
targeting should be reappraised since having a credible inflation target will help getting out 
of a deflationary spiral as well as avoiding deflation in the first place.  
In addition to monetary policy, options of fiscal policy and intervention policy are 
reviewed. It seems that each policy instrument alone may have difficulties pulling the 
economy out of deflation. However, with a combination of various policies, along with 
inflation targeting, may have a best bet to combat deflation. The Japanese experiences of 
deflation in the late 1990s and the beginning of 2000s will give an interesting case study for 
the future macroeconomic management and monetary policy.  
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